In the absence of lack of inherent jurisdiction to deal with the issue, the judgment is a nullity. It has no existence in law. It is well settled in law that the judgment passed is a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction

Part-1

25/02/2017

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10131 OF 2016
[Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 31556 OF 2013]
Mohammed Ansari ... Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents
JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J.
The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Executive Engineer (E&M) vide order dated 03.06.1985 in Border Roads Engineering Services (BRES) by the competent authority of the Government of India, Ministry of Shipping and Transport. In due course, he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (E&M) on 30.05.1997 and thereafter promoted to the grade of Superintending Engineer (E&M) in General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF) of Border Roads Organization in the pay scale of Rs.12000-375-16500/- with effect from the date he assumes the charge of the post. The appellant after completion of more than requisite years of service was not granted non-functional financial upgradation for officers of Organised Group A and that compelled him to make representation to the concerned authorities but the same were turned down on the ground that he had not fulfilled the stipulated command posting of two years. Being aggrieved by the said communication, the appellant preferred Original Application No. 102 of 2012 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati.
2. The respondent filed a preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction of the tribunal. The tribunal decided the issue in favour of the appellant vide order dated 18.06.2012. The tribunal referred to its own decision in Ramkali Mishra & Ors. v. Union of India passed by the Lucknow Bench wherein it has been held as follows:-
“9. From what has been discussed above, the applicant, who is a directly recruited personnel of G.R.E.F., is governed by Rules of 1965 except for those rights which are restricted by S.R.O. 329 as amended by SRO 364 and 330 issued under section 4 of the Act of 1950 and read with Article 33 of the Constitution of India, in view of this, this Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the present O.A. filed against the order of removal passed against the applicant under Rules of 1965.”
Being of this view the tribunal opined that it has jurisdiction to entertain the original application.
3. Dissatisfied with the order of the tribunal, the respondents preferred W.P. (C) No. 4074 of 2012 seeking quashment of the order passed by the tribunal. The High Court by the impugned order dated 2.8.2013 posed the following question:-
“Whether a member of the GREF can be regarded as member of Armed Forces, for, such a member, if regarded, in law, as a member of the Armed Forces, then, would the provisions, embodied in the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, not be available to such a member?
4. The High Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in R. Viswan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors1, reproduced various passages from the said authority and also the order passed in S.L.P. (C) No. 8096 of 1995 (Union of India v. Smt. Vidyawati) and came to hold as follows:-
“In the light of the decision, reached by the Supreme Court, in Vidyawati’s case (supra), one can have no escape from the conclusion, and we do conclude, that as far as Central Administrative Tribunal is concerned, a member of the GREF is not covered, in the light of the decision in R. Viswan (supra) read with the decision in Vidyawati’s case (supra), by the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and, hence, a member of the GREF would be disentitled from invoking the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal.”
5. Thereafter, the High Court addressed the issue whether a member of the GREF is covered by the provisions embodied in the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (for brevity, “the 2007 Act”). The Court adverted to the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 (for short, “the 1950 Act”), the provisions contained in the 2007 Act, the Central Civil Services (Control, Classification and Appeal) Rules, 1965, the authority in Union of India & Ors. v. Sunil Kumar Sarkar2, and eventually arrived at the following conclusion:-
“32. What surfaces from the above discussion is that the present respondent, as a member of the GREF and a member of the Armed Forces, cannot, in the light of the decision, in R. Viswan (supra) read with the decision, in Vidyawati’s case(supra), and could not have taken recourse to the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Consequently, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal has/had no jurisdiction in the matter of the petitioner’s (i.e., the present respondent’s) grievance as regards refusal to grant him financial upgradation and, at the same time, the respondent’s grievance shows that even the Armed Forces Tribunal cannot redress, and could not have redressed, his grievance as regards refusal to grant him financial upgradation. The remedy of the respondent, therefore, lies in making appropriate application in the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, or in instituting appropriate suit for remedy of his grievances.”
6. Challenging the said order, it is contended by Ms. Priya Hingorani, learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has failed to appreciate that the nature of grievance raised is adjudicable before the Central Administrative Tribunal and as a fact after determining the issue of jurisdiction which was raised as a preliminary issue, the tribunal has dealt with the controversy and granted the relief which has gone unassailed and in such a situation, the High Court should have declined to interfere. Learned counsel would further submit that the reliance placed by the High Court on the authorities in R. Viswan (supra) and Sunil Kumar Sarkar (supra) is founded on an inapposite appreciation, for the claim of the appellant is absolutely different. Additionally, it is urged that the delineation as regards lack of jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal suffers from fallacious reasoning. Lastly, it is canvassed that this Court may finally determine the forum and allow the appellant to prosecute his remedy, for he cannot have a grievance without a forum to agitate.
7. It is further urged that the High Court has failed to appreciate the impact and effect of the clarificatory circular issued by the office of Director General, Border Roads dated 6th June, 2012 as a consequence of an indefensible view has been expressed by the High Court which is required to be annulled.
8. Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents contends that the High Court has appositely held that the Central Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to dwell upon the matters relating to employees of General Reserve Engineering Force which constitutes a part of the Border Roads Development Board (BRDB). It is her submission that the Armed Forces Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in terms of exceptions carved out under SRO 329 and 330 which have been issued by the Government in exercise of its power under Section 4(1) of the 1950 Act. It is put forth that these exceptions and these exceptions exclude the GREF from the purview of the 1950 Act in certain cases which pertain to service matters. On that basis, the learned counsel would urge that Section 2(1) of the 2007 Act though applies to all persons subject to the 1950 Act, yet regard being had to the language employed in SRO 329 and 330, the matters related to the service conditions of GREF would be governed by the Central Civil Service Rules, 1965. Therefore, submits the learned senior counsel, it is only the High Court that can entertain a lis relating to service dispute under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
9. It is not in dispute that the appellant is a member of GREF in Border Roads Engineering Services. In R. Viswan (supra), the Constitution Bench was engaged in the interpretation of Article 33 of the Constitution and with the issue whether Section 21 of the 1950 Act read with Chapter IV of the Army Rules, 1954 is within the scope and ambit of Article 33 and, if it is, whether Central Government Notifications Nos. SRO 329 and 330 dated September 23, 1960 making, inter alia, Section 21 of the 1950 Act and Chapter IV of the Army Rules, 1954 applicable to the General Reserve Engineering Force are ultra vires that Article since the General Reserve Engineering Force is neither an Armed Force nor a Force charged with the maintenance of public order. The larger Bench dealing with the same adverted to the primary functions of GREF, the provisions of the 1950 Act and opined that so far as the personnel of GREF are concerned, they are partly drawn from the Army and partly by direct recruitment. Army personnel are posted in GREF according to a deliberate and carefully planned manning policy evolved with a view to ensuring the special character of GREF as a force intended to support the Army in its operational requirements.

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