The trump card

24/02/2021

For a year now, India has been claiming it has the skill and tenacity in high-altitude warfare, including Siachen, whereas the People's Liberation Army (PLA) - which perhaps for the first time had occupied posts on Kailash range since 1962 - does not have similar talents. China has imposed additional deployment costs of Rs 1,000 crore, excluding Rs 20,000 crore in emergency operational acquisitions, which is a godsend as in normal course, the transactions would not have materialised. Some questions on disengagement from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) need to be asked again: Why did India withdraw from the commanding heights on Kailash range without quid pro quo like Return Status Quo Ante (RSQA) April 2020 integrally linked with withdrawal from Depsang and instead settle for vacation from just north-south banks of Pangong Tso? The answer was located in Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi's interviews last week.
China diverted the PLA on training in Xinjiang to intrude at multiple places from Depsang to Demchok across 300 km of east Ladakh. India looked like a tubelight bereft of counter-intrusion contingencies. China pushed the LAC westwards to its 1959 claim line, establishing a buffer zone at Galwan and refusing to discuss Depsang. The Galwan clash and an Indian coup de main in that order froze and nudged disengagement which secured an Indian vacation from dominating heights on Kailash range overlooking Chinese garrisons at Moldo and Spanggurlake. As in the first disengagement, it is advantage China. Beijing has imposed economic costs, transforming the LAC into LoC. While India has politically withstood China's bullying, the perception in the neighbourhood about India's ability to be a net security provider has been cast in doubt.
Still the Government has to be congratulated for providing, for the first time, critical operational information about the ongoing three Ds - Disengagement, De-escalation and De-induction. In the past, contradictory information would be leaked by the Government and military officials even as independent journalists claimed they had their own sources, all of which led to mammoth confusion. Last week Lt Gen Joshi, who was pilloried over last year's multiple intrusions, explained how the disengagement deal came about following an audacious tactical operation by stealth to seize strategic heights on Finger 4 and on Kailash range on August 29/30 to turn the tables on the PLA. That these operations were on the Indian side of the LAC does not diminish their brilliance. To be clear, details of withdrawal on the south bank are not as specific as on the north bank. In the written agreement, no mention is made of RSQA April 2020 though discussion on other friction points is included. The resumed dialogue on Saturday ended not in a written agreement but a joint statement to "push for a mutually acceptable resolution of remaining issues so as to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in border areas".

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